By Akwasi Oppong-Fosu
Introduction: A Nation in Crisis
Under the Akufo-Addo administration, Ghana faced one of its most turbulent governance periods. The economy struggled with high interest rates, a depreciating currency, unsustainable debt levels, and record budget deficits. Unpopular policies such as the Domestic Debt Exchange Program (DDEP) and the E-Levy deepened public frustration, while corruption scandals and partisan appointments to key institutions further eroded trust in governance.
At the same time, social divisions grew. Ethnic and religious tensions intensified, and protests became more frequent as citizens expressed their dissatisfaction with declining living standards and governance failures. A staggering 87% of Ghanaians believed the country was heading in the wrong direction. In response, John Mahama campaigned on a promise to “reset the nation,” a message that resonated with voters and earned him a strong electoral mandate.
Amid this national crisis, the relevance of the Council of State came under scrutiny. Many questioned whether it was fulfilling its role as an independent advisory body or merely serving as an extension of the executive. Calls for reform—or outright abolition—grew louder. The challenge now is how the Council can reinvent itself to become a truly independent institution that contributes meaningfully to governance.
The Council of State: Mandate, Composition, and Performance
Established under Article 89 of the 1992 Constitution, the Council of State is tasked with advising the President, Parliament, and other state institutions. It is intended to serve as a non-partisan body that ensures governance decisions align with the national interest.
The Council is composed of:
• Appointed Members – Eleven individuals selected by the President.
• Elected Regional Representatives – Ten members, each elected by a region.
• Ex-Officio Members – Former Chief Justices, Chiefs of Defence Staff, and Inspectors General of Police.
While its recommendations are non-binding, the Council is expected to act as a moral compass for governance. However, its performance has been widely criticized. Instead of providing meaningful oversight, it has been seen as a passive institution that merely validates executive decisions. Many argue that the high number of presidential appointees compromises its independence and effectiveness.
How Does Ghana’s Council of State Compare to Other Countries?
Many other democracies have similar advisory or oversight bodies, but with significant differences:
• United Kingdom (House of Lords) – Functions as an upper legislative chamber, reviewing bills and government policies. Unlike Ghana’s Council of State, it has structured powers to scrutinize executive decisions.
• South Africa (National Council of Provinces) – Represents regional interests, with elected members actively influencing legislation and governance decisions.
• Nigeria (National Council of State) – Composed of former presidents, governors, and key officeholders, offering institutional memory and continuity in governance, though its influence remains largely advisory.
Given these models, Ghana could benefit from transforming its Council of State into a more structured upper chamber with clearly defined oversight responsibilities. This could strengthen accountability and prevent excessive executive control.
Enhancing Transparency and Accountability
One major issue with the Council of State is its lack of transparency. Unlike Parliament, which conducts public debates and hearings, the Council’s deliberations are largely hidden from public view. To address this, several reforms are necessary:
1. Public Deliberations – Major discussions should be conducted in public, similar to parliamentary sessions.
2. Regular Reports – The Council should publish reports detailing its recommendations and the government’s response, ensuring accountability.
3. Stronger Oversight Powers – While advisory in nature, the Council’s input on key policy matters should require the executive to provide formal justifications for deviations.
Mediating Between Arms of Government and Social Conflicts
Beyond its advisory role, the Council of State could be more actively engaged as a mediator between the arms of government and in broader national conflicts. Ghana has seen increasing tensions between the executive, legislature, and judiciary, as well as growing social unrest. The Council could play a key role in:
• Resolving Institutional Conflicts – Political disagreements between the executive and Parliament, or between the judiciary and the government, could be managed through the Council’s mediation, ensuring institutional harmony.
• Fostering Political Dialogue – In times of heightened political polarization, the Council could facilitate dialogue between opposing parties, ensuring national unity.
• Addressing Social and Ethnic Tensions – As an impartial body, the Council could intervene in ethnic, religious, or regional conflicts to promote peace and national cohesion.
• Guiding Electoral and Governance Reforms – By working with the Electoral Commission, Parliament, and civil society, the Council could help ensure consensus-driven reforms that strengthen democracy.
To effectively assume this role, the Council must be empowered with clear conflict-resolution mechanisms and given the necessary legal and financial resources to operate independently in mediation efforts.
Should the Council of State Be Wholly Elected?
A major point of debate is whether the Council of State should be fully elected instead of maintaining its current mix of appointed and elected members. Those in favor of a wholly elected Council argue that it would:
• Enhance Democratic Legitimacy – A fully elected Council would derive its authority directly from the people, making it more representative and accountable.
• Reduce Executive Influence – With nearly half of the current Council appointed by the President, its independence is compromised. Elected members would be more likely to serve the national interest rather than align with the executive.
• Strengthen Public Trust – Elections would increase transparency and reduce the perception that the Council is an elite or partisan institution.
However, some argue that a fully elected Council could introduce new challenges:
• Increase Partisan Competition – If members are elected through political processes, the Council could become a mirror of Parliament, losing its intended role as a non-partisan advisory body.
• Compromise Expertise – Elections might prioritize popularity over competence, potentially sidelining experienced professionals and statesmen whose input is crucial for governance.
• Weaken Institutional Stability – A Council subject to political cycles could see abrupt shifts in composition, reducing its ability to provide consistent, long-term guidance.
A Better Balance: Reducing Presidential Appointments
Rather than an extreme shift to either full elections or full appointments, a reformed model should reduce presidential influence while maintaining institutional balance. Some possible reforms include:
• Reducing Presidential Appointments – The President should not have the power to appoint nearly half of the Council. Limiting appointments to a small fraction—such as ex-officio members or recognized statesmen—would ensure expertise without allowing the executive to dominate the institution.
• Strengthening the Regional Election Process – Ensuring free, transparent, and competitive regional elections for Council representatives would reinforce democratic legitimacy.
• Introducing Parliamentary Oversight – Instead of unilateral presidential appointments, Parliament could play a role in vetting and approving Council members to enhance accountability.
A Mid-Term Council: Overlapping Tenure with the Executive
One bold reform proposal is installing the Council of State at the mid-point of a presidential term rather than aligning its tenure with that of the executive. This would:
• Enhance Independence – A Council that does not enter office alongside the President would be less likely to function as a rubber stamp.
• Ensure Continuity – By overlapping presidential administrations, the Council could serve as an institutional stabilizer rather than a partisan body.
• Improve Policy Evaluation – A mid-term Council could assess the government’s progress and provide recommendations that are less influenced by political pressures.
Conclusion: The Need for Urgent Reform
The Council of State stands at a crossroads. If it continues in its current form, public calls for its abolition will only intensify. However, through meaningful reforms—such as increasing transparency, strengthening oversight, enhancing its mediation role, implementing a mid-term appointment structure, and reducing presidential influence—it can regain relevance.
Transforming it into a more structured upper chamber or enhancing its advisory influence could make it a vital pillar of governance. As Ghana embarks on a national reset, the Council of State must evolve to meet the demands of a more accountable and transparent democracy.